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A lack of creativity and political will is placing the country’s Metropolitan Police Departments (MPDs) at
risk of losing legitimacy, as management and councils pay lip service to evidence of dwindling
organisational integrity. The introduction of targeted and random integrity tests within the departments
is urgently needed to turn the tide on abuses of power, and can be implemented easily enough. 
In 2003 the United States Embassy in South Africa
hosted a videoconference between the New York
City Police Department’s (NYPD) Internal Affairs
Bureau (IAB) and key stakeholders in the South
African Police Service (SAPS), other government
bodies, and the research community. The aim of
the conference was for the IAB to share its
experience of combating police corruption so that
lessons could be transferred to South African
institutions. The conference was thoroughly
documented by Gareth Newham and the
document widely disseminated.1 Even so, the
central message of the IAB has failed to result in
substantial changes to any police organisation in
South Africa. In the meantime such tests have
been recommended and adopted by police
organisations in Canada, Australia and Britain,
among others.
This article revisits the central tenets of the
conference, reiterates the need for integrity tests,
and presents simple examples of how they might
be applied in South Africa. It focuses on
application in the country’s MPDs, all of which
have internal anti-corruption units that could
easily pursue these strategies. However, the
message is as relevant to the SAPS and other law
enforcement agencies.2
CORRUPTION IN THE MPDS
Research suggests that within the public sector
bribes are most often requested in relation to
traffic policing, followed by regular policing.3 This
reflects particularly badly on metro police who are
responsible for both traffic law enforcement and
crime prevention. Public discourse around
roadside bribery is particularly prevalent with one
metropolitan area infamously earning itself the
nickname ‘Fifty Rand metro’ in reference to the
money required to ward off traffic fines. 
Beyond victimisation surveys and public discourse
it is difficult to quantify the prevalence of
corruption in the MPDs. Disciplinary data are not
published and difficult to obtain. Even when
available, these data only reflect those instances
where corruption has been exposed. This means
little if one considers that in any police agency
most corruption goes unreported, and that South
African MPDs don’t proactively seek to expose
corrupt officers. 
BEING PROACTIVE
Following the 1992 Mollen Commission of
Inquiry into corruption in the NYPD, the Internal
 
Affairs Bureau was formed based on the premises
that:
1. A proactive approach is necessary if police 
corruption is to be effectively addressed
2. An independent internal investigative police 
unit is the most effective and efficient structure
for tackling police corruption4
While the SAPS Anti-Corruption Unit (ACU) was
controversially closed down in 2002, the country’s
MPDs all have some form of anti-corruption unit
built into their structure. One exception is the
Durban MPD where the city Ombudsman’s office
assumes this role. Depending on the MPD, these
units do some or all of the following: 
• Ensure system compliance by officers and staff
• Conduct (mostly announced) inspections of 
officers and staff
• Investigate all reported misconduct and where 
necessary follow up with traps and surveillance
of suspect officers5
While on the surface this mandate appears to
constitute proactive action against corruption, it
pales in comparison to the steps taken by the IAB
in the form of field integrity tests. When police
administrators don’t act decisively in detecting and
acting against corruption they indirectly legitimise
it.6 This is the case in South Africa, where rhetoric
is often strong but creative, proactive action lacks. 
Entrapment legislation for the state of New York is
similar to that of South Africa. Both allow for the
creation of an opportunity to commit a crime
without providing undue incentive to do so. As
stated in South Africa’s Criminal Procedure Act
the conduct must not ‘go beyond providing an
opportunity to commit an offence’ unless state
security is under threat.7
Through targeted and random integrity tests, the
NYPD’s Internal Affairs Bureau provides such
opportunities for officers to commit crimes. These
tests involve real life scenarios that police officers
might expect to encounter in the course of their
normal duties. The difference is that, unbeknown
to the responding officer, the scenarios are
purposefully constructed and closely monitored by
IAB officials. One example given during the
conference included staging an accident and leaving
the vehicle with the police. Drugs planted in the car
create an opportunity for a dishonest officer to
remove these before booking the vehicle into the
station. More elaborate tests are constructed by the
IAB to ensure the legitimacy of random tests, or to
target already suspect officers. These tests can
involve weeks of preparation and can be resource
intensive. 
Within a South African context many may argue
that such elaborate traps would be a waste of
resources, while random traps and tests would
consume the time of honest officers who could be
attending to ‘real’ crime. This point is valid.
However, the perceived extent of police corruption
in the country, and its link to a loss of faith in the
police8 requires that drastic proactive action be
taken. If, after a year or two of constant testing, it is
found that the majority of officers behaved
professionally and ethically in test environments,
then these tests could be toned down. But initially
both complex and simple tests should be conducted
randomly and across the board. 
Numerous criminological theories, from Classical
to Control, suggest that all of us are potential
criminals. The argument follows that we all
constantly ask ourselves questions such as: Who
will know about this action? What is the likelihood
of being caught (if my action is illegal/immoral)?
How severe is the likely punishment? 
Similarly, research conducted by the NYPD
suggested the correlating factors among officers
arrested for corruption were that:
• They were greedy
• An opportunity presented itself, and
• They did not believe that they were going to 
get caught
Frontline police with immense discretionary powers
operate in isolation or in very small groups. This
gives them ample opportunity to secretly engage in
illegal acts. In the case of corruption the crime is
often mutually beneficial, so the civilian involved
may not report the incident. This is particularly
true for MPD officers working in traffic
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enforcement or vehicle licensing, but includes
officers working in all manner of environments. 
A major flaw in the management of anti-
corruption efforts in South Africa’s MPDs is the
perception that the number of complaints received
by the department accurately reflects the levels of
corruption.9 In other words, if complaints figures
are low then corruption is under control. Units
and managers who even entertain this argument
immediately place their own legitimacy in
question. The reality is that the more pervasive
corruption becomes, the less faith the public is
likely to have in the institution and the less likely
they are to report the crime. Similarly, the more
entrenched corruption is within organisational
culture, the less likely it is that officers would
report one another. The probability of this
occurring is already extremely low. 
If departments are to be seen to be taking
corruption management seriously they should roll
out a random and targeted integrity testing
programme and publicise the percentage of passes
and failures, as well as the action taken against
those who fail. Like the NYPD, many police
agencies prefer not to report on the exact number
of tests conducted, so that officers are constantly
kept guessing. Newham’s report shows that while
the IAB conducted around 1 000 tests per year;
officers believed that closer to 6 000 were
conducted. Clearly then, the IAB succeeds in
projecting a sense of omniscience in the minds of
officers. Importantly, officers who pass tests are
not informed of this fact, but are left with the
belief that they have simply completed another
daily task. This means that they must treat every
encounter as a potential test and engage it with
professionalism and integrity.
INTEGRITY WITHOUT ENTRAPMENT 
One of the reasons MPD internal affairs units give
for not trapping or testing officers more often is an
alleged difficulty in securing entrapment orders.
Applying to the Director of Public Prosecutions for
an order requires prior evidence of wrongdoing on
the part of the suspect officer(s). Given that
internal affairs units don’t act against members
unless they receive a solid complaint, evidence of
wrongdoing is scarce and few entrapment orders
are applied for. Units need to get more creative in
detecting corruption. 
The focus on entrapment orders is also
incongruent with an organisational philosophy
held by some senior managers – that one can’t
simply fire or prosecute an officer every time s/he
is found wanting.10 The logic in this approach is
that an organisation has invested so much time
and money in the development of officers that it is
better to rehabilitate than to punish them. While it
may not please some members of the public, this
argument does hold value. Any form of justice
should arguably focus on education and
rehabilitation rather than punishment. 
However, if a department knows it does not want
to pursue criminal prosecution in the majority of
cases, entrapment orders are not required for the
setting of traps. Internal affairs units can conduct
as many random tests as they please, as long as the
evidence collected is only used for internal
disciplinary hearings. If evidence of criminal
activity is uncovered in this process, the Director
of Public Prosecutions can then be approached to
secure an entrapment order, and a targeted trap
can be set. 
It is important that tests and traps are
implemented with sensitivity so as not to destroy
the morale of good officers. In order to do this a
number of strategies could be adopted. Most
important would be clear communication of
intentions – to improve the image and
professionalism of the organisation. Random
testing could be marketed within the organisation
in a manner that encourages pride and a shift in
organisational culture – one that embraces honest
police and reports dishonesty.11 One of the simplest
ways to do this would be to replace the name ‘anti-
corruption unit’ with ‘professional standards unit’
and sell the units as focusing on the improvement
of professionalism. Units could also openly target
specific groups, such as rookies or the recently
promoted. Such targeting is easily justified, and
those groups are then forewarned. 
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An important and non-punitive benefit of
integrity testing is that it allows for the
measurement of professionalism and the
highlighting of unprofessional trends in an
organisation. For example, tests might not reveal
corruption, but may show flaws in the manner in
which officers engage the public, using, for
example, inappropriate language or force. By
uncovering such trends through hard evidence,
they can be addressed at training and
institutional, rather than individual, levels.
RANDOM INTEGRITY TESTING FOR
MPDS
Examples of tests that could be developed for the
MPDs include:
• At a staged accident the drunk ‘driver’ (a sober 
actor with alcohol on his/her breath) verbally
abuses the responding officer (testing public
engagement and arrest compliance, creating
opportunity for bribery)
• A ‘suspect’ is left in the custody of officers. 
The suspect provokes them (testing
professionalism) or hints at bribe payment in
exchange for release
• Monitored vehicles are sent through a road 
block to ascertain whether they are dealt with
according to the operation’s directives (i.e.
vehicle search, roadworthy and licence check,
alcohol awareness, overloading, seatbelt
compliance)
The practical and legal subtleties of these and
other scenarios would need to be developed by
experienced metro officers in conjunction with a
prosecutor or labour lawyer, so that they do not
go beyond the normative professional experiences
of officers and are conducted within the ambit of
labour and criminal law. Nor should they unduly
entice officers through aggressive persuasion to
commit a crime. 
Importantly, such testing would allow MPD
management to ensure compliance of
organisation-wide and operation-specific
directives, both new and old. As such it need not
be approached or communicated to staff as an
anti-corruption mechanism, though ultimately
this would be one of its major spin-offs. 
CONCLUSION
The approach to integrity management outlined
in this article is just as relevant to the SAPS as to
the country’s MPDs. Indeed, arguments could be
made for a professional standards and integrity
unit located within the SAPS, or entirely
independent of all police organisations, but
monitoring all law enforcement agencies. The
country’s MPDs are well positioned to spruce up
and get serious about their anti-corruption and
integrity management strategies. Without the kind
of proactive monitoring of the police outlined in
this article, MPDs (and other law enforcement
organisations) risk developing an unstoppable
momentum down the slide to illegitimacy. 
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